Distribution of Fake Apps / Repackaged Apps (Highest Risk)
“It’s a parenting app… why have I started getting spam calls?”
An expectant parent, anticipating childbirth, installed a parenting app to view weekly pregnancy updates.
They entered the baby's name, registered their due date, and uploaded ultrasound photos.
However, starting a few days later:
• Insurance and loan calls from unknown numbers
• Overseas login notifications
• Text messages attempting to approve payments
The problem was not server hacking. The ‘app’ installed by the user was fake.
Why Childbirth and Parenting Apps Are Most Attractive to Attackers
Childbirth and parenting apps handle personal information more sensitive than any other service.
• The baby's name, date of birth, and photos
• Parents' account information and passwords
• Family relationships and lifestyle patterns
• Even in-app payment information
Once this information is leaked, it becomes data that follows the child throughout their entire growth process.
Therefore, attackers target the user before the server.
Problems Based on Real-Life Cases
“The server was safe, but the app was the problem”
In the case in question, there were absolutely no signs of intrusion on the platform server. However, the investigation revealed that:
• Repackaged apps that cloned the official app were being distributed
• The icon, name, and UI were nearly identical
• Installed via links from external markets or communities
Users entered their personal information directly without any suspicion.
With this single installation, the following critical information was leaked externally all at once:
• Child information
• Parent account
• Payment information
Why are fake apps / repackaged apps the ‘highest risk’?
The reason this attack is the most dangerous is clear.
• No need to breach the server
• No need to bypass security systems
• The user opens the door themselves
“An attack where the user opens the door themselves”—this is the very essence of a fake app attack.
Specifically, what security issues were there?
The core of the problem is that the app could not prove on its own whether it was ‘genuine.’
• Inability to verify whether it had been tampered with or repackaged
• Normal execution even in malicious environments
• Inability to block server integration from the fake app
In other words, there was no verification of trust regarding the app's execution environment.
How LIAPP · LISS · LIKEY Defended
The platform shifted its approach. Instead of a "post-incident response," it adopted a method of blocking access from the moment the app is launched.
• Verification of app integrity
• Detection of repackaged or modified apps
• Identification of abnormal execution environments
• Blocking access based on automation or scripts
• Analysis of user behavior patterns
Services do not open at all in fake apps
Blocking malicious attempts to collect information
Protection of children's information and parent accounts
What has changed since implementation?
After security implementation
• Sharp decline in cases of damage caused by fake apps
• Cessation of personal information leakage incidents
• Restoration of user trust
The most significant change was the perception that "it is safe to enter children's information."
Lessons from this case
Security standards for childbirth and parenting apps must differ from those of general services.
• Once leaked, data cannot be restored
• The victims are children, not adults
• If trust is broken, the service cannot survive.
The starting point for childbirth and parenting app security is verifying whether the "app is genuine," not the server.
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